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The title to this brief synopsis of the papers in this symposium
intentionally conveys a double meaning. First, and most straightforwardly, it
is an introduction to the symposium itself. Second, however, it also connotes
that the Roberts Court's first year was but an introduction to this field for this
newly constituted group of nine. During the new Chief Justice's tenure,
which is expected to last several decades and will likely encompass many
more changes in the Court's membership, the jurisprudence of election law
will undoubtedly undergo profound transformation. One wonders, when
future scholars at the close of the Roberts Court look back on its treatment of
election law, how much of the transformation could have been anticipated at
the outset.
I. ELECTION LAW: A FIELD OF ITS OWN'
The United States Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction, with
cases ranging from patent law to criminal procedure. It is not a specialized
tribunal devoted to election law. Therefore, it may be unfair for scholars who
specialize in election law to expect the Court to have an overarching vision
of election law that guides their resolution of disputes in the distinctive areas
* Director, Election Law @ Moritz, & Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Professor of
Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. Many individuals deserve
great credit for this symposium. The Ohio State Law Journal's Symposium Editor, Matt
Byrne, worked with Dan Tokaji and me to plan the topic and invite the participants. In
addition, Matt handled virtually all the organizational details, with assistance from Laura
Williams and Irene Mynatt. Once the editing of papers began, Executive Editor Linda
Mindrutiu supervised the process with exceptional skill and diligence. Throughout the
entire process, Editor-in-Chief Todd Starker provided leadership that enabled everyone
involved to perform at their highest levels. Moreover, completing the publication of this
symposium would not have been possible without the ongoing dedication of the new
Editorial Board, led by Chad Eggspuehler and Andy Johnson. Finally, of course, we are
all deeply grateful to the symposium's participants, who have provided such valuable
scholarship.
I In 1999, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review published its own symposium
entitled "Election Law as Its Own Field of Study." See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law at
Puberty: Optimism and Words of Caution, 32 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 1095 (1999)
(introduction to that symposium).
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of campaign finance, legislative redistricting, and voting procedures. Instead,
it is understandable that the Court, when faced with a First Amendment issue
in a campaign finance case, draws upon its general vision of the First
Amendment, as it applies to "fighting words," pornography, and other topics
unrelated to election law. Or, when the Court confronts a claim of race
discrimination in the context of legislative redistricting, it invokes principles
developed in other kinds of race discrimination claims.
Still, election law is conceptually coherent as a field that unites the
specific areas of campaign finance, legislative redistricting, and voting
procedures-as well as other specific areas, like ballot access and the
regulation of party primaries. Attorneys with candidates, parties, and other
political actors as clients cut across the different sub-specialties of election
law (Bob Bauer and Ben Ginsburg being prominent examples 2). Scholars,
too, have organized the disparate areas of election law into a single whole for
the purpose of teaching the subject to law students. (All the authors of the
two casebooks in the field are participants in this symposium. 3) It is not
unreasonable, therefore, to expect that election law practitioners and
academics would offer the Supreme Court ideas and principles concerning
their field as a whole, with the view that the Court would employ these ideas
and principles to resolve particular cases in a way that makes the cumulative
body of the Court's precedent cohere as a sensibly unified law for this
domain of human activity. In this respect, election law would be similar to
other fields, like antitrust or securities regulation, whose practitioners or
scholars inform the Court about guiding principles for those domains, with
the expectation that the Court there will endeavor to make each new decision
fit into the overall body of law for each field.
Moreover, election law as a field has affinities with constitutional law,
which might be considered the Court's specialty if any subset of law is. Not
only does much of the Court's work in election law involve the resolution of
constitutional rather than statutory questions (although statutory issues exist
as well, to be sure), but the function of election law in society is closely
related (although not identical) to the function of constitutional law. The
purpose of election law is to establish a set of ground rules for the operation
of the democratic process, which will identify the government officials
authorized to make the regular laws for society. The purpose of constitutional
law is to establish the foundation for the exercise of governmental authority,
2 Glenn Justice, Lawyers Follow the Money, and Debate How the Candidates Can
Use It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13 2004.
3 DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d. ed. 2004); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (2d.
rev. ed. 2002).
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including the lawmaking power, although constitutional law also identifies
limits on that power for the purpose of protecting individual rights. Both
election law and constitutional law are foundational, then, in the sense of
creating frameworks for and setting in motion the exercise of conventional
legislative power by democratically chosen and accountable officials.
The Court is expected to have an overall vision of constitutional law,
which guides its resolution of difficult constitutional questions in particular
cases. There may be intense debate on what that vision should be-
originalism, fundamental fairness, democracy-enhancing (which would
underscore the connection between election law and constitutional law),
common law incrementalism, or something else4-but most observers of the
Court want it to have some form of principled methodology that guides its
constitutional decisions, rather than just having the Court engage in a series
of arbitrary, ad hoc judgments that collectively lead to a jumble of conflicting
(and confusing) precedents. 5 For the very same reasons, the Court equally
could be expected to have a vision of election law, which guides the Court's
decisions that affect the structure and operation of the democratic process.
II. ELECTION LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT: No UNIFIED VISION
There has been a sense among election law scholars, however, that the
Court lacks a coherent vision of election law. Rick Hasen, among others, has
characterized the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence as incoherent, both
within itself and in relationship to other areas of election law-a theme he
develops in his contribution to this symposium.6 One needs to point only to
the Justice Kennedy's pivotal indecisiveness in Vieth v. Jubelirer,7 as have
many of this symposium's participants, to support the proposition that the
4 For useful introductions to these and other theoretical perspectives on
constitutional interpretation, see JOHN H. GARVEY, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DANIEL
A. FARBER, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER (5th ed. 2004); MIC14AEL J.
GERHARDT, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., REBECCA L. BROWN & GIRARDEAU A. SPANN,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2000).
5 Even the leading proponent of theoretical minimalism, Cass Sunstein, has
indicated that he believes minimalism should result in an internally consistent and
rationally explainable body of precedent. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean
Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2006). In this respect, Sunstein's own version of
minimalism, relying heavily on reasoning by analogy, shares affinities with common law
incrementalism as an overarching methodology for the adjudication of constitutional
questions.
6 Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and
Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849
(2007).
7 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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Court during Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure developed no coherent
approach to partisan gerrymandering claims. Likewise, of all the academic
attacks leveled against Bush v. Gore,8 perhaps the most persistent has been
that its "sub-minimalist" reasoning displays no animating vision but only
result-oriented "ad hockery."9
With the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the transition to the new
Roberts Court, it is natural to ask whether this next era will generate the
coherent vision of election law that the previous period lacked.
Coincidentally, moreover, the first year of Chief Justice Roberts' tenure
included two important election law cases on the Court's docket: Randall v.
Sorrell,10 a campaign finance case, and LULAC v. Perry," a redistricting
case. Consequently, the Ohio State Law Journal and Election Law @ Moritz
convened this symposium to consider, in light of these two cases or
otherwise, what might be said about the Roberts Court's approach to election
law-just as this new Court takes its first steps into this field.
Now that the Court has decided these cases, and this symposium has
occurred, 12 the initial assessment is that the Roberts Court shows no more
sign of developing an overarching vision of election law than its predecessor
and that it is difficult to see one emerging without further changes in the
Court's membership. Perhaps it is just still too early to tell. As Pam Karlan
deftly observes in her contribution to this symposium: "When it comes to the
Roberts Court and the law of democracy, the early returns are ...
provisional." 13 But it may also be true that, for the time being, in the field of
election law as in so many other areas the Roberts Court is really the
Kennedy Court-and Justice Kennedy has yet to settle on an overarching
vision, either one of his own or the competing ones offered to him by his
colleagues on his left or right, principally Justice Breyer or Justice Scalia. In
her own distillation of this symposium, Heather Gerken argues that a
coherent election law jurisprudence from the Court will emerge only if and
when either Justice Breyer or Justice Scalia gets a secure fifth vote. 14
8 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9 1 discuss this point in my own contribution to this symposium. See Edward B.
Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
10 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
1 1 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
12 Webcasts of the panel discussions that occurred at the Moritz College of Law on
September 29-30, 2006 as part of this symposium, are archived at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjournal/symposium/2006-07/index.php.
13 Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 743 (2007).
14 In her words, "[w]e are still one presidential election away from knowing which
coalition will choose which path the Court will take as it wends its way through the
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Given the obstacles to identifying an overarching vision of election law
for the Roberts Court---either descriptively, in terms of what Justice Kennedy
(or his successor as the pivotal fifth voter) is likely to articulate; or
prescriptively, in terms of what reasonably has a chance of persuading
Justice Kennedy to embrace (instead of his persistent tentativeness)-the
contributors to this symposium for the most part have chosen to focus on a
single area within election law. Enough uncertainty exists within each of
these areas to warrant fruitful commentary, even after the Roberts Court's
first forays into these terrains. It is, therefore, perhaps more prudent to set
aside for another occasion the more daunting scholarly task of offering a
unified understanding of election law as a whole, at least one that has a
plausible chance of prevailing during the Roberts Court era.
III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE: WAITING FOR THE COURT'S NEXT STEP
In the area of campaign finance, like Rick Hasen, 15 Richard Briffault
sees the Roberts Court's initial opinions as muddying the waters even
further. 16 Brad Smith, who himself observes that he comes to questions of
campaign finance from a very different normative perspective than Hasen
and Briffault, shares this descriptive assessment of the Roberts Court's early
work. 17 All three anticipate a deregulatory approach eventually taking hold
(with Smith providing a roadmap on how the Court could get there), although
just how quickly depends upon the attitude towards stare decisis adopted by
Justice Kennedy and the two new members of the Court. The Roberts Court's
next decision on campaign finance, coming soon in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life18 (on rebound from its pre-Alito
remand' 9), will presumably shed more like on this subject. In any event,
because campaign finance is one area in which Justice Kennedy is more firm
in his convictions, it may develop its own internal conceptual clarity more
quickly than other specific areas, or than election law as a whole.
political thicket." Heather Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
15 Hasen, supra note 6.
16 Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of
Campaign Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807 (2007).
17 Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, a New
Court Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (2007).
18 No. 06-969 (oral argument held on Apr. 25, 2007).
19 Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006).
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IV. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS: A STATUS Quo OF INDECISION
On the topic of partisan gerrymanders, by contrast, LULAC revealed that
Justice Kennedy remains a fence-sitter. Michael Kang characterizes Justice
Kennedy's unwillingness to commit to a position on the issue as a failure of
"judicial confidence," rather than failure of judicial vision.20 Justice
Kennedy, according to Kang, recognizes the need for judicial policing to
protect the structure of democratic politics from excessive partisan
gerrymanders, but lacks the "will" to impose a standard of fair representation
in the absence of a consensus on its normative appeal prior to its judicial
imposition-whereas the Warren Court was bold enough to impose "one
person one vote" without such a consensus, which developed only
afterwards.
Justice Kennedy's willingness to intervene has not likely been increased
by the Democratic Party's ability to regain control of the U.S House of
Representatives despite all the gerrymandering that was thought to give the
previous Republican majority a cushion in last year's midterm elections. But
Sam Issacharoff, in his contribution to this symposium (co-authored with
Jonathan Nagler), presents statistics showing just how sweeping the
electorate's repudiation of the incumbent majority party must be before
popular sentiment can overcome the insulating effect of partisan
gerrymandering. 21 For example, a 4% swing (from 52%-48% one way, to
52%-48% the other way) would not be enough to change which party
controls Congress, given the power of gerrymandering to protect the
incumbent party from popular responsiveness. Indeed, here in Ohio, where
Democrats won most major statewide elections in 2006 (U.S. Senate,
Governor, Attorney General, Treasurer, and Secretary of State), and whose
candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives received a majority of
statewide votes (53%-47%), the Republican Party still captured a majority of
congressional seats (11 out of 18)-arguably due to a particularly effective
partisan gerrymander in 2002 of the state's congressional districts.22 Whether
new statistics like these can be converted into a constitutional standard that
convinces Justice Kennedy, however, remains much in doubt.
20 Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won't Make Law: Paralysis and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
21 Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics: Diminishing
Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
22 See Editorial, End Gerrymandering, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2007;
Johnathan Riskin & Jim Siegal, District Lines in Ohio Foil Democrats, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 2006; Edward B. Foley & Bradley Smith, Ohio Must Get Rid of
Gerrymandering, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 2006.
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V. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN DISTRICTING:
THE LULAC SURPRISE
The most innovative and, to many, unexpected development of the infant
Roberts Court in the field of election law was the separate holding in LULAC
that one of the districts in the Texas redistricting plan violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. This holding provided further confirmation that the
Roberts Court is, at least in current composition, truly the Kennedy Court, as
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-member majority on this issue, over a
vigorous dissent from the new Chief Justice. Much discussion has occurred
in this symposium over what to make of this Voting Rights Act holding,
which by all accounts is extremely significant and may prove revolutionary.
In addition to a brief summary in the paragraph that immediately follows,
Heather Gerken analyzes the various contributions to this symposium that
address the Voting Rights Act innovation in LULAC, and she adds her own
thoughts about the different doctrinal directions in which it could develop
(depending, in part, on which faction of the Court gains the upper hand
through future appointments). 23
Rick Pildes thinks LULAC, despite the superficial success of the section
2 claim in the case, signals the end of protecting against the dilution of
minority voting power under the traditional understanding of section 2 that
has prevailed since Thornburg v. Gingles.24 Instead, he sees LULAC as a
potential precursor for the reinvigoration of Shaw v. Reno, which seeks to
purge race from the districting process and thus is antagonistic to mapmaking
efforts to avoid minority vote dilution. Guy Charles is not convinced that
Pildes is correct on this point.2 5 Rather, Charles suggests that Justice
Kennedy's opinion in LULAC may reflect a more nuanced conception of
racial representation that, although perhaps superseding Gingles, is at odds
with the hostility to any form of race-based districting in Shaw. Ultimately,
however, Charles agrees with Ellen Katz that the best understanding of
Justice Kennedy's treatment of the Voting Rights Act in LULAC is less about
racial identity than it is about political participation. 26 Although Charles and
Katz differ in the details of their analyses, and each deserves careful
attention, both see Justice Kennedy as working towards a conception of
electoral competitiveness or accountability, by which a politically cohesive
group of voters who have the potential of garnering a majority of votes in a
23 Gerken, supra note 14.
24 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated
Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
25 Guy-Uriel Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
26 Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
2007]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
district have a right to mount a competitive challenge to an incumbent whom
this group considers unresponsive to its interests. On this view, LULAC
might turn out to be the first step in the development of a constitutional
standard for policing political gerrymanders after all--or, somewhat more
narrowly but just as importantly, LULAC may signify that challenges to
political gerrymanders will prevail if but only if they can be shoehorned into
a race-based Voting Rights Act claim.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND VOTING ADMINISTRATION:
BEYOND BUSH V. GORE
When this symposium was planned, the Roberts Court was not expected
to have issued a new decision in the specific area of voting administration,
which concerns the procedures for casting and counting ballots. Yet
speculation on how the new Roberts Court might treat the most famous
precedent of the Rehnquist Court, Bush v. Gore, is interesting enough, and I
have devoted my own contribution to this symposium to that topic.27
Analyzing the array of potential Equal Protection claims that emerge from
the voting administration problems that persist in the aftermath of the 2000
presidential election, I develop a taxonomy for classifying these claims in
relationship to the Bush v. Gore precedent, and I consider how the Roberts
Court might rule on the merits of these claims as well as the likelihood that
the Court would grant review in a case presenting them. I am grateful that my
efforts have inspired thoughtful contributions from Dan Lowenstein, who
provides an alternative and (I believe) usefully complementary taxonomy,28
and John Fortier, who goes somewhat further than I do in seeing the practical
significance of Bush v. Gore as being limited to a small subcategory of
potential claims.29
As it turns out, the Roberts Court did issue a voting administration
precedent in October 2006, Purcell v. Gonzalez,30 during the run-up to the
midterm elections. Involving a challenge to Arizona's new voter
identification law, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision was limited to
the procedural ruling that the Ninth Circuit erred in issuing a preliminary
injunction when the district court had refused to do so. As part of analyzing
the future of Bush v. Gore, I consider Purcell as one indication among
several that the judiciary-and particularly the Supreme Court-will not be
27 See Foley, supra note 9.
28 Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
29 John C. Fortier, Foley on the Future of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
30 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
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as receptive to the strategic use of litigation to affect the process of casting
and counting votes as some have thought in light of Bush v. Gore. Also
addressing Purcell, my colleague Dan Tokaji criticizes its reasoning and
argues that the Court's intervention was unwarranted given the proven ability
of lower courts to manage these cases in ways that both (1) distinguish
meritorious from unmeritorious claims and (2) provide much-needed clarity
to participants in the electoral process.31 As part of her survey of the Roberts
Court's first forays into the field of election law, Pam Karlan observes that
Purcell, despite the apparent innocuousness of its unanimity, has the
potential for destabilizing the substance of vote dilution law,32 a point that
Tokaji also makes in somewhat different terms in his own analysis of the
opinion.
VII. THE COURT'S LARGELY DISCRETIONARY DOCKET:
A GOOD IDEA FOR ELECTION CASES?
Unlike all the other contributors to this symposium, Michael Solimine
focuses exclusively on the procedures by which election law cases reach the
Supreme Court, rather than on the content of the Court's rulings once they
get there. 33 But this much-neglected procedural topic is a crucial one, for the
reasons Solimine himself describes as well as related observations made by
both Tokaji and me in our separate analyses of potential Supreme Court
review of lower court rulings in future voting administration cases. When the
Court controls what cases to consider on the merits, it can select cases in a
way that facilitates the development of the law in a particular direction.
Conversely, when the Court is obligated to decide the merits of an elections
case even if it would prefer to duck it, the Justices must render whatever
rulings their consciences dictate the law requires on the facts before them,
even if their consciences might not accord with their temptations-and for
that reason they might prefer to leave the case alone.
It is perhaps no accident that the most interesting and significant
development in the Roberts Court's consideration of election law last year
came in the context of an issue that the Court likely would have declined to
consider had the case not been one of the few within the Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction. The important Voting Rights Act holding in LULAC
was a tagalong to the much more prominent issue of partisan
gerrymandering. Had the case fallen within the Court's discretionary
31 Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in
Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
32 Karlan, supra note 13.
33 Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development
of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIo ST. L.J 767 (2007).
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jurisdiction, the Court likely would have agreed to consider only the partisan
gerrymandering question, leaving the Voting Rights Act issue behind. But
required to rule on this issue as well, Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote
for an important and arguably surprising decision, which may be somewhat
out-of-sync with Justice Kennedy's predilections regarding Voting Rights
Act cases.
Given the incoherence in the Supreme Court's election law jurisprudence
observed by so many of this symposium's contributors (incoherence both
with each specific area of election law and across the field as whole)-and
given Justice Kennedy's pivotal indecisiveness-perhaps it is time to rethink
whether it is desirable for the Justices to have such wide discretion on which
election law cases to review on the merits. 34 Perhaps if the Justices were
forced to consider many more election cases presenting questions of federal
law, coherence would develop as a result of the accumulation of precedent
resolving particular facts. It would be harder for the Justices to overrule or
distinguish precedents they personally dislike, since the bonds of precedent
tying cases together would be thicker and deeper. The Justices could not
select cases strategically, a practice that may enhance ideological
polarization and, in turn, exacerbate incoherence, particularly when changes
in the Court's composition cause shifts in the Court's own voting patterns
and strategic alliances. If new Justices were pinned down on what the law
requires regarding a larger range of factual circumstances, and having no
choice but to consider each new case as it comes, the Justices might have less
maneuverability to make ideologically motivated pronouncements that
engender confusion about what the law entails. This model of mandatory
judicial consideration of the merits of each case as it arises is obviously not
the practice as it has developed in the Supreme Court, but it is the standard
conception of common law adjudication, where the coherent wisdom of the
law is supposed to emerge precisely as a result of such accretion.
Perhaps the Roberts Court will be able to develop such coherence in the
field of election law without the need for this kind of procedural reform.
Time will tell. Based on the views expressed in this symposium, however, it
has a long way to go in this regard-and, except for the specific area of
campaign finance, there is not much reason to expect that the Court will get
there anytime soon.
34 Solimine suggests some procedural reforms different from, but not inconsistent
with, the one I tentatively mention in this Introduction. Most importantly, he
demonstrates that the Court's procedures for election cases are "not necessarily outcome-
neutral" and therefore deserving of the careful attention he gives them. Id.
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